Since gaining independence from Portugal in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has become one of Africa’s most politically unstable nations. Over the past five decades, the country has witnessed more than ten coups and attempted coups, making military intervention almost routine. Only one democratically elected leader has completed a full term in office, a reflection of the deep structural weaknesses at the heart of the state.
What began as a promising liberation movement has slowly deteriorated into what the United Nations once called Africa’s first “narco-state”—a fragile country plagued by drug trafficking, corruption, poverty, and a powerful, interventionist military. These forces together have kept Guinea-Bissau trapped in a cycle of crisis. Guinea-Bissau’s instability is rooted in its liberation struggle. The PAIGC, which fought Portuguese colonial rule, merged political authority with military command. When independence came, the former guerrilla fighters formed the backbone of the national army.
This legacy created a security sector that viewed itself not just as a defender of the country but as a guardian of the political order, giving it a sense of entitlement to intervene whenever it deemed civilian leaders incompetent or threatening to its interests.On November 14, 1980, Prime Minister João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira overthrew President Luís Cabral in a bloodless coup. Vieira installed a military-dominated government, setting the precedent that political power could be seized with force rather than won through democratic processes.In 1998, Brigadier-General Ansumane Mané launched a coup attempt after being accused of smuggling arms to rebels in Senegal’s Casamance region. The failed attempt spiralled into a civil war between Mané’s forces and troops loyal to Vieira.
Backed by Senegal and Guinea, government forces fought for nearly a year before collapsing in 1999. Vieira fled, marking a violent turning point driven largely by rivalry within the military hierarchy.On September 14, 2003, Army Chief of Staff General Veríssimo Correia Seabra toppled President Kumba Yala. The coup unfolded amid severe economic decline, unpaid public servants, and widespread frustration. The military justified its intervention as necessary to restore order, though it only reinforced the template of unconstitutional turnovers.The 2009 killings of President Vieira and Army Chief Tagme Na Waie—within hours of each other—highlighted the growing influence of drug traffickers. Though not officially a coup, the assassinations reflected deep infiltration of criminal networks into both the military and government, turning political rivalries into lethal competition for control of lucrative trafficking corridors.In April 2012, soldiers seized power just before a presidential run-off election. The military accused the government of inviting Angolan troops to reform the armed forces—seen as a threat to military autonomy. Analysts dubbed it the “cocaine coup” because of its links to drug-trafficking interests, underscoring how narcotics money had captured the state.
2024
2022: A gun battle around the government palace targeted President Umaro Sissoco Embaló, who survived and blamed drug-trafficking networks.
2023: Clashes erupted when National Guard soldiers freed two detained officials, revealing deep divisions within security forces.
2024: Authorities thwarted another plot involving senior officers, demonstrating how coup planning had become almost predictable.On November 26, 2025, troops arrested President Embaló and announced a takeover on state TV. The military suspended state institutions, closed borders, and claimed it acted to prevent an alleged plot involving politicians and a “well-known drug baron”. The move mirrored previous interventions—another attempt justified in the name of “restoring order” amid a disputed election.Guinea-Bissau’s geography—remote islands, weak borders, and limited naval capacity—has made it a prime transit hub for cocaine from Latin America to Europe. Drug profits dwarf the national economy, making corruption irresistible.
With the state unable to pay soldiers decent salaries, traffickers easily recruit security officials. By the late 2000s, the military had become deeply entangled in the drug trade, and political power became ysynonymous with controlling trafficking routes.

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